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United States (2)
Abstract
For the first 50 years of the history of broadcasting and telecommunications in the United States, two models,
not one, governed ownership and regulation in the telephone and radio industry. United States regulators
oversaw a monopoly in telecommunications (though not a state monopoly, as in Europe). By contrast, US law
provided for competition in br0adcasting. While AT&T, the monopoly telephone carrier, controlled nearly all
telephone traffic, US regulators established a system of competing private broadcast stations.
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United States (2)
By Monroe E. Price andlonathan WeinbeJ3T
FOR THE first 50 years of the history of. broadcasting and.... .telecommunications in the United States, two models, not 0Ile,. . governed ownership and regulation in the telephone and... .. . radio industry. United States regulators oversaw a monopoly. in telecommunications (though not a state monopoly, as in
Europe). By contrast, US law provided· for competition in br0adcasting.
While AT&T, the monopoly telephone carrier, controlled nearly all
telephone traffic, US regulators established a system of competing
private broadcast stations.
This system began to break down as technology weakened its underlying
categories. In broadcasting, the entry of cable television caused the
traditional model of competition among local broadcast stations to lose
much of its·· meaning. Increasingly, video programming came to· be
distributed through natural-monopoly cable systems, rather than
through local broadcast stations; At the same time, the monopoly model
for telephony came under technological and legal attack. The federal
courts in the 19705 opened the door for competition in long-distance
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services;l the possibility of.c0mpetition in the local loop came not long
after. ... .
By the late 1980s, regulators were contemplating the possibility that
telephone companies could compete with cable and that cable could
compete in providing local exchange services. The cable industry ~gan
to relax its opposition to telephone company entry mto cable, a.s cahle
saw a powerful business.9'ppor~!y for itself in the markets formerly
reserved for telephone companies. Industry negotiators began exploring
the possibility of legislation to lift the prohibitions keeping each industry
out of the other's territory.· The federal courts began to gainsay the
constitutionality of rules forbidding telephone companies from providing
video programming, or owning cable television systems, in their
.telephone service areas.2 It became clear that the traditional prohibitions
.segregating cable television from telephone service would not long
survive.
In this chapter, we eXarr$l~ traditional US thinking concerning mass
media ownership and then review recent developments. Those
developments include the 1995 communications regulation reform bills
before Congress, still under negotiation as this publication goes to press.
Olanges in laws of ownership·are a window into changed conceptions of
the role of media policy in the United States.
Under traditioDaI United States policY, newspapers have not been able to
own television stations in their markets (and vice versa), telephone
companies and cable companies have been kept at arms length, the law
has required television stations and cable systems in common viewing
areas to be separately owned, and there have been carefully calibrated
limitations on the number of radio or television stations anyone entity
could hold. All of that may soon be swept away.
The traditional policy framework
Traditional United States thinking regarding mass media ownership and
control has rested oil two assumptions. The first is descriptive: it predicts
that a speaker's identity will strongly influence the social narrative his
speech conveys. The second is normative: it prescribes that the owner of
the physical communications resources - printing press, broadcast
1See MCI Telecommunicatio~sCorp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (DC Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 980 (1978);
Mel Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (DC Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 US 1040
(1978).
2The leading decision is Oiesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. granted, 63 USLW 3906 (US 26 June 1995).
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station or whatever - used to disseminate speech should control that
speech.
The first assumption posits a link between the identity of a speaker and
the, content of its speech. Speakers, the theory runs, tell stories reflecting
their own backgrounds, identities, and views.3 Government policies
affecting the makeup of speakers will affect the content of their speech.
The second assumption derives from the central role of private
autonomy; and, property rights, in United States constitutional thinking.
A fundamental theme of United States free-speech philosophy has been
that government's role in the market-place of ideas is presumptively
limited. to the enforcement of property rights in communications
resources, and other common-law support for private ordering. A crucial
role of free speech, the theory runs, is to serve as a check on overreaching
government;! free speech is best protected from government interference,
.and is best able to fulfil that role, when the private owner of
communications resources controls their use.s
Consistently with that vision, the drafters of the 1934 Communications
Act took pains to specify that a broadcast licensee'shall not... be deemed
a common carrier,' required by law to carry programming provided by
others.6 Indeed, the FCC for many years deemed it an abdication of a
broadcaster's public-interest duty for it to relinquish legal control over
the programming it broadcast?
Beginning in the 194Os, US policy makers built up a set of ragged, not
always articulated, understandings flOWing from these two assumptions.
Different media· owners would provide different media voices. More
owners would mean more voices. A range of owners would lead to a
3 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 US 547, 569-83 (1990); Wendy M Rogovin, The
Regulation of Television in the Public Interest On Creating a Parallel Universe in Which Minorities
Speak and Are Heard, 42 Catholic L. Rev. 51, 54~8 (1992).
4 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am B. Found. Res. J. 521.
5 Th'us A.I. Liebling's quip 'Freedom of the press is guaranteed to all those who· own one.' A.J.
Liebling, The Press 32 (1975).
6 47·USC § 153(h). The Communications Act itself provides some exceptions to this rule; the most
important is 47 USC § 312(a)(7),requiring broadcasters to sell reasonable amounts of time to
candidates for federal elective office for political advertising. See Columbia Broadcasting System v.
FCC, 453 US 367 (1981). The Supreme Court relied on section 153(h) when, in ·1979, it struck down
FCC rules requiring caJJle systems to offer channeis for public, educational and governmental use.
Those rules, the Court explained, impermissibly imposed common-arrier obligations. FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp.. 440 US 689 (1979). Congress later revisited that issue in the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984; see infra text accompanying note 35.
7 See, eg, Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917 (DC Clr. 1978); Filing of
Agreements Involving the Sale of Broadcast Time for Resale, 33 FCC2d 654 (1972). The Commission
largely abandoned that position in Part-Time Programming, 82 FCC2d 107 (1980).
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range of views or social narratives, rendering the comm~ty of listenersL
more content with the responsiveness of the system. A mUltiplicity of/
owners would lead to competition; competition would lead to robust .... ,
. . . . ., ',"
open discussion, Access.by speakers would be more equal, in part ..~ ....
because media outlets would be sympathetic to a wider variety ofviews. . ..
The Federal Communicahons Conunission drew on this vision in ..
developing its concentration policies; it sought to achieve 'diversification ..
of programme arid 'serVice viewpoints,' an<f'thuS··'tI:le preconditions'for
democratic discourse, by encouraging diversity in ownership.8 Rather
than seeking to regulate speech content directly, it promulgated rules·
establishing what might be called an 'ownership access' policy, .
The Commission began in 1938 by adopting a strong presumption
against allowing more than cine AM radio station under common
ownership in a single community.9 Within a short time, the Commission
. had rules in place barring the ownership in a single market of more than
one station in any given broadcast service - AM, FM, or television. Until
1970, though, FCC rules still allowed a person to own an"AM~ aU-'FM,
and a television station in the same community. The FCC partially
plugged that gap in 1970 and 1971, banning the acquisition by a single
entity, in a single market, of both a radio and a VHF television station. lO
The agency explained:
A proper objective is themaximum diversity ofownership that
technology permits in each area, We are of the view that 60 different
licensees are more desirable than 50, and even that 51 are more
desirable than 50. In a rapidly ch4nging social climate,
communication of ideas is vital. Ifa city has 60 frequencies available
but they a.re licensed to only 50 different licensees, the number of
sources for ideas is not maximised. It might be the 51st licensee that
would become the communication channel to a severe social crisis,l1
The FCC relaxed its 'orie-to-a-rnarket' rules in 1989, and again in 1992.
Under current law, licensees may own up to three or four radio stations
in a given market,12 and the Commission will look favourably on
8Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership, 18 FCC 288, 292-93 (1953).
9Genessee Radio Corp., 5FCC 183 (1938), .
10 Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and TV Broadcast Stations, 28 FCC2d 662 (1971)(reconsidering Multiple Ownership, 22 FCC2d 306 (1970)).
11 Multiple Ownership, 22 FCC2d 306, 311 (1970).
12 Licensees in markets with fewer than 15 radio stations may own up to three, so long as they own
£ewerthan half of the stations in the market Licensees in markets with 15 or more stations may own
up to four. No entity may oWn stations whose combined audience share, as of the filing date ofan
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requests for waiver, in large markets, of the bar on radio-VHF
combinations.13
The FCC began in 1940 to limit the number -of broadcast outlets that
could be owned by a single entity in different geographical markets.
Under rules promulgated in 1953 and 1954, no entity could own more
t:han seven AM, seven FM, and seven television stations (of which no
more than -five could be VHF) nationwide.14 This approach, the
Commission explained, would promote 'diversification of program
services' without 'governmental encroachment on... the prime
responsibility of the broadcast licensee.'15 The Commission later relaxed
these rules too, in 1984 and again in 1992. Under current law, one may
own 20 AM and 20 FM radio stations nationwide.16 One may own up to
12 television stations, provided that then- aggregate reach is no more than
25 per cent of the national audience.17 _
The most'full-blown FCC articulation of the relationship of ownership to
public discourse came in the -context of newspaper-broadcast cross-
oWnership. The agency first addressed this question in 1970. In almost
100 cities, newspapers and television -stations were under common
control. In a few communities, the daily newspaper was under common
ownership with the only radio or television station. The FCC determined
that this _concentration of ownership was inconsistent With its
assumptions about democratic discourse. It banned the formation of new _
newspaper-broadcast combinations, and required divestiture where the
owner of the sole newspaper in a community was also the owner of the
sole television station, or of the sole radio station in a community that
application to acquire anew station, exceeds 25 per cent. No entity may own more than two stations
in the same service. Radio Multiple Ownership Rules, 7FCCRcd. 6387 (1992), on reconsideration, 9
-FCCRcd. 7183 (1994).
13 Second Report and Order, 4FCC Red, 1741, on reconsideration, 4FCC Red. 6489 (1989).
14 Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership, 18 FCC 288 (1953),43 FCC 2797 (1954).
The Supreme Court upheld the rules in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 US 192 (1956).
15 18 FCC at 293.
16 Radio Multiple-Ownership Rules, 7FCC Red. 6387 (1992), on reconsideration, 9FCC Red. 7183
(1994). Aminority owner may hold up to five additional stations in each service; anon-minority
holder may hold non--<:ontrolling interestS in up to five additional minority or small-business
controlled stations.
17 Amendment ofMultiple Ownership Rules, 100 FCC 2d 17 (1984), on reconsideration, 100 FCC2d
74 (1985). UHF stations are counted at only one-half of their theoretical reach, because of the_physical
limitations of their signals. Minority owners can hold up 10-14 stations, and non-minority owners can
acquire non-eontrolling interests in two additional minority-eontrolled stations. Aggregate audience
reach can be as high as 30 per cent, provided that five per cent of that reach is contributed by
minority-eontrolled stations.
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had no television .station18 It was intolerable, said the Commission,. to
allow such an entity an 'effective monopoly' in the local marketplace of .
ideas. The Supreme Court affinned; it upheld as rational the
Commission's finding that 'diversification of ownership would enhance
the poSSibility of achieving greater diversity of viewpoints.'19 '
Congress and the FCC have imposed cross-ownership restrictions in
other areas. It·is illegal for a person to control a television broadcast·
station and a cable system in the same market.20 It is illegal for a person
to control a telephone company and a cable system in the same area.21
That prohibition, though, is hotly contested; the Supreme Court is now
debating its constitutionality..
The link between ownerShip and content
Much ofUnited States broadcast regulation since 1934 has been based on,
and has sought to reinforce, the link between ownership and content.
That connection was cr.udal if the Conuriission was to pursue a'poliCy of
ownership access - if it was to·bring about diversity of speech through
. ownership regulation.
. The emergence of radio networks provided one early threat to that link.
The Corrunission initiated extensive inquiries in 1938 into the new 'chain
broadcasting,' reflecting its concern that binding contractual relationships
made national networks the true' owners rather than local licensees.
Those contractual relationships threatened the Commission's ideal· of
discourse driven by independent, competitive local voices. The FCC
announced regulation intended .to ensure the 'independence' of the local
outlets, emphasising the local broadcaster's ability to replace network
offerings with programming more idiosyncratically responsive to~the
local conununity.22
18 Second Report and Order, 50 FCC 2d 1046 (1974), on reconsideration, 53 FCC 2d 589 (1975), aff'd
in part & rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Citizens Coinm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,555 F.2d 938 (DC Cir.
1977), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 436 US 775 (1978).
19 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 US 775, 796 (1978).
20 47 USC §533(a).
21 Ibid. §533(b). The FCC has taken the position that it can waive this prohibition for telephone
companies complying with its video dialtone rules. Telephone Company - Cable Television Cross--
Ownership Rule, 10 FCC Red. 7887 (1995).
22 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 US 190 (1943). In 1977, the Commission
repealed almost all of its rules governing the network-affiliate relationship in radio. Network
Broadcasting by Standard (AM) and PM Broadcast Stations, 63 FCC2d 674 (1977). Over the past year,
the Commission has proposed to repeal almost all of its rules regulating the network-affiliate
relationship in television. See, in particular, Programming Practices of Broadcast Television Networks
and Affiliates, 1995 FCC LEXlS 3979 (15 June 1995).
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Later on, the Commission sought to address the link between ownership
.~. and content from a different perspective: It provided that it would grant
.a preference, in comparative licensing hearings, to owners who promised
that they would participate in station management on a full-time basis.23
An oWnership access policy, after all, would make rather less sense if
owners did not involve .themselves in station. management and
programmirig decisions.24
,.• Probably the dearest example of FCC reliance on assumptions about the
relationship. of ownership to narrative, in attempting ·to achieve the
conditions for democratic discoUrse, was the agency's effort to encourage
ownership of radio and television stations by minority group members.
The FCC gave minority group members special, privileged opportunities
to become owners, granting those groups enhanced opportunities to
compete in the market for loyalties.25 The Commission gave an
advantage in comparative hearings to minority would-be licensees, so
long as they promised to participate actively in station· management; it
gave other licensees. facing possible revocation or non-renewal an
.incentive to transfer their licenses to minority owners; and it established a
tax certificate programme granting favourable tax treatment to any
broadcaster selling its station to a minority owner.26 .
The Commission designed these progranunes with the goal of altering
the social narrativeP and defended them in the Supreme Court on
precisely that basis: expanded minority ownership, the Commission
argued, would produce more diversity in broadcast speech. In 1990, a
majority of the Supreme Court agreed.28 The Court gave weight to FCC
and congressional statements findings a link between expanded minority
23 See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast HeaIings, 1 FCC 2d 393, 395-96 (1965).
24 In 1994, the DC Circuit declared the FCt's focus on owner participation in station management to
be arbitrary, and hence impermissible. Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (IX: Cir. 1994).
25 See Monroe Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media ani::! the Gklbal Competition for
Allegiances', 104 Yale L;J. 667 (1994). .
26 See Minority Ownership of Broadcastirig Facilities, 68 FCC 2d 979 (1978). On the tax certificate
programme, see Bruce R Wilde, Note, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of Broadcast
Facilities: A Critical Re-Examination of Policy, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 979(1990). The Commission gave
women a similar preference in comparative hearings, see Mid-Florida Television Corp., 70 FCC 2d
281, 326 (Rev. Bd. 1978), setasid!! on other grounds, 87 FCC 2d 203 (1981), but it did· not include
women in the distress sale or tax certificate programs. The DC Circuit held the comparative
preference for women unconstitutional in Lamprechtv. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (DC Cit. 1992).
27 See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Fadlities, 68 FCC 2d 979 (1978).
28 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 US 547 (1990); see Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L.Rev
583 (1991).
271
oWnership and greater broadcast diversity.29 It cited evidence that 'an
owner's minority status influences the selection of topics for news
coverage and the presentation of editorial viewpoint, especially on
matters of particular concern to minorities,' and that 'a minority owner is
more likely to employ minorities in managerial and other important roles
where they can have an impact on station policies:3o
A 1995 Supreme Court decision disfavouring any sort of racially-defined
government preference, though, left the prograrnIne moribund;31 the
Commission is now reconsidering all of its licensing preferences.32
Evaluation of traditional approach
The FCCs ownership access policy had a mechanical truth to it. If one is
seeking to achieve diversity in speech, a system with more owners seems
better than one with fewer. The policy's assumptions, however, were
incomplete. Its descriptive predicate - that a speaker's identity strongly
determines the content of its speech~ underestimated the flattening and
homogenising effect of the commercial market-place.
In broadcast television, where the numbers of speakers in each ,local
market'have been few and each licensee has sought to attract a lowest-
common-denominator mass market, broadcast offerings have been
largely homogenous notwithstanding the Commission's diversity efforts.
For the most part, network affiliates have simply adopted or 'cleared'
network programming during prime time. Even non-network offerings
have tended to vary little, in significant respect, from one speaker to the
next. Broadcast television licensees, no matter how diverse, ~d to
choose their programming with an eye to maximising audiences and
advertisfug revenues.33 In radio, the market is more segmented, but the
likelihood .is, still small that any speaker speaks with a genuinely
distinctive voice.
Nor has the slight racial diversity in ownership achieved by the FCC led
to the kind of prograinme diversity with overtones important in
furthering pluralist goals. At the margin, stations owned by minority
groups are somewhat more sensitive to minority issues; perhaps they
29 497 US at 569.
30 Id. at 58D-581.
31 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (l995).
32 See Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 FCC Red. 2664
(1992), 8 FCC Red. 5475 (1993), 9 FCC Red. 2821 (1994). Congress has acted independently to end the
tax certificate programme.
33 See generally C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. Pa 1. Rev. 2097 (1992);
Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 Calif, L. Rev. 1101, 1152-57 (1993). '
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have better affirmative action records. But .there has not been a
·....convincingshoWing that, where a broadcast owner is interested in
maximising profit,. the nature of the speech varies substantially with the
nature of the owner.
The inipact of the new media
Cable brought a different perspective to the video market. In the vast
majority of US markets, the cable operator is a local monopolist. While
cable television has brought many more channels to each household -
.. 500r 70 or 500 --, each cable operator more or less controls its entire
system, choosing each of the programmers that the system will carry.
On the other hand, a profit-maximising cable operator will likely seek to
carry diverse programme channels in order to increase subscribers. Cable
operators have no day-ta-day control over those programming services
once .they make the initial choke to carry' them. (The strategy is
reminiscent of the argument, long made by PIT advocates in the context
of European broadcasting but ill-tolerated at the FCC, that· a single
maIiager of frequencies will maximise audience by purposely and
rationally diversifying, playing to small segments, 'in the way that only a
monopolist can do.)
Cable's programming structure,· thus, achieves greater diversity in
programme offerings at the cost of tearing a small hole in the central
assumption of United .States concentration rules: the link between
ownership of communications facilities, and meaningful control over the
messages conveyed by speech distributed using those facilities.
Perhaps recognising that shift, federal cable television regulation has
incorporated Significant corrunon-carrier aspects since 1984. The 1984
Cable Communications Policy Act requires larger cable systems to make
leased-access cha:nriels available to unaffiliated. programmers; without
regard to the coritent of the programming the outside programmers
provide.34 The same act authorises local franchising authorities to require
cable operators to provide public access.channels, and channels reserved
34 47 USC § 532. The efficacy of this provision is unclear; battles continue to rage over the rates that
programmers must pay for leased access. In 1992, Congress amended the statute to allow cable
operators to decline to carry leased-access programming 'that the cable operator reasonably believes
describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as
measured by contemporary commlIDity standards! Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. 1. No. 102-385, § 10(a); 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992) (codified at47 USC'
§ 532(h»; see Alliance for CommunityMedia v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (IX:: Cir. 1995), cerl granted, 64
USLW 3347 (US 14 Nov. 1995).
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for educational or governmental use; the cable operator is forbidden to
exercise editorial control over those channels.35
The FCC, in its video dialtone proceedings, allows telephone companies
to distribute video programming only if they establish common-carrier
platforms accommodating multiple outside programmers on a non-
discriminatory basis.36 Cable's position in the video market has paved
the way for a<new~approach to access and diversity issues,one with a
role for common carrier regulation. Even the most passionate critics of
FCC regulation of broadcasting concede the legal permissibility -- if not
desirability - of common carrier regulation of the old and the new
media.37
The new media policy
Today, the old approach to ownership regulation lies in ruins. It is no
longer possible to think. about regulation in terms of separated categories
- broadcasting and te1econununications - for the transmission of
information. Inthenew global economy, many.US legisJators.5ee more
need. to support huge media entities that can compete internationally and
contribute to a more favourable balance of payments, than to ensure that
minorities within the borders of the United. States have their say. In the
eyes of many, the new abundance of channels of commumcation means
that government need. no longer seek to ensure diverse and competing
speakers. .
The FCC, spurred by huge increases in the nwnber of broadcast outlets,
has dismantled much of its ownership regulation, and has proposed to .
dismantle more. At the start of 1995, the FCC solicited comment on
whether it should relax its rule forbidding ownership of two television
stations in a single market, whether it should relax or even eliminate its
bar on radio-TV combinations in a single market, and whether it should
eliminate its numerical station limit on ownership of television stations in
35 47 USC § 531. Congress in 1992 directed the FCC to promulgate regulations enabling.cable
operators to prohibit, on such channels, programming that contains 'sexually explidt conduct, or
material soliciting or promoting uniawful conduct' Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No: 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460,1486 (1992); see Alliance for
Community Media, supra note 34.
36 See Telephone Company -Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules (Reconsideration and Third
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 10 FCC Red. 244 (1994).
. 37 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Prindples for
Converging Communications Media, 104 Yale L. J. 1719, 1737-39 (1995).
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different markets, perhaps raising the aggregate audience reach cap as
high as 50 per cent.38 ·
The telecommunications reform bills, still being negotiated in Congress at
the time of writing, provide hints of the new ownership law. They
embody no rigorously worked out vision; instead, they. are based on
vaguely sketched and optimistic hopes. They may not be enacted at all,
for President Clinton has threatened a veto. Whether. or not they are
enacted, though, and regardless of their precise details, they show the
spirit of the age.
What is most striking about the bills, from the perspective of this volume,
is their near-elimination of broadcast ownership rules. The House bill
would allow a person to own two VHF television stations in a single
market, subject to FCC oversight; indeed, with FCC permission, a person
could own more than two. It would eliminate the radio-VHF and
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership bans, allowing the FCC to impose
restrictions on the cross-ownership of broadcast and non-broadcast
media only on a case-by-case basis, where a particular instance of cross.:.
oWnership would lead to undue concentration of media voices. Both bills
would eliminate any numerical limit on radio' station ownership, either
local o~ national.39 Both bills would eliminate any national .limit on
television ownership other than a 35. per cent aggregate audience reach
cap.
What philosophy and structure do the new bills supply, as the old rules
are swept away? Their goals are. sweeping: the Senate bill speaks of
bringing into being a world in which all Americans have access to 'high-
speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability' enabling
users to 'originate and receive high-quality... graphics and video
telecommunications.' How do their drafters expect to achieve that end?
The answers the new bills supply is an uneasy mix of competition - the
product of radical deregulation - and new common carrier thinking.
The bills start by imposing a duty on local telephone companies to
provide full interconnection, and non-discriminatory access, to other
entities seeking to provide local telephone or information services. By
requiring'interconnectiort, the drafters plan to subject local telephone
companies to competition from cable companies and new 10ca:1
38 Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 10 FCC Red. 3524,
3568,3575-78,3580-81 (1995).
39 The Senate bill would allow the FCC to refuse to approve particular transfers of radio licenses
where the transferee would 'obtain an undue concentration of control or wQuldthereby harm
competition.'
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telecommUnications .providers. The bills pre-empt local-govenunent
barriers to cable companies' provision of telecommunications services..
In return for interconnection. the bills grant the telephone companies a
variety of boons. First,.'with FCC permission, they· can provide long-
distance service. Under the House bill, indeed, the FCC may approve a
telephone company.'..s entry into the long-distance market,.c~g ca1!s
originating in its local service area, even if the company is not in fact
subject to competition in its local service area. It is enough that the
company has filed, and the'FCC and state authorities have approved, a
statement of the terms pursuant to which it would offer interconnection
if it received a bona fide request.
The bills promise telephone companies flexibility in FCC rate regulation,
eliminating that regulation entirely for services subject to effective
competition They include only weak provisions designed to ensure
continuation of service to poor and rural users. They authorise te.!~hone
companies to offer 'electronic publishing' and other information services.
Most importantly for our purposes, the bills authorise telephone
companies to provide video programming. Under both bills, telephone
companies have the option of acting as traditional cable operators,
subjectto local franchising requirements and other regulation. Under the
House bill, a local telephone company can buy up to a one-halfshare in
an existing cable company in its service area, and can buy the company
outright if the area is roral.40
The bills, though, give telephone companies another -option;,ihey...are
freed entirely from local franchising and regulation if they choose to offer
video programming over a common-earrier video 'platform.'41 Under
the House bill (the Senate's is similar), a telephone company establiShing
a video platform must establish channel capacity sufficient to cover all
bona fide requests· for carriage, and must construct new capacity as
necessary to meet demand. '
The telephone company may not discriminate against unaffiliated
providers with regard to the terms of carriage, or with regard to the
quality .of service, transmission or interconnection.·It .may .not
unreasonably discriminate in its own favour with regard to information .
provided to subscribers for purposes of selecting programming, although
it may negotiate contracts with unaffiliated providers 'to allow consumer
access to their signals on any level or screen of any gateway, menu or
40 Under the Senate bill, purchase limitations are more restrictive.
41 Video platform providers maybe required to pay local fees in lieu of franchisefees.
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program guide.' It is subject to rules, to be .prescribed by the FCC,
ensUring that it offers public and leased access, and carries the signals of
local broadcast stations, on terms similar to those governing conventional
cable systems. In return for shouldering conunon-earrier obligations, in
short, the bill offers nationally-oriented telecorrununications megafirms
the opportunity to provide video services subject only to FCC oversight,
free from any need toanswer to state and )Ql;:al government.
The bills follow up by removing most cable rate regulation. The House
bill provides that 270 days after the FCC completes its new video
platform regulations, all cable and video dialtone systems will be deemed
subject to effective competition, .and freed from rate regulation except art
the tier of service including local broadcast Signals. As for those Signals,
the FCC.can review a rate increase only if three per cent of a system's
subscribers complain, individually, within 90 days·after a rate increase.
The Senate bill, for its part, provides that the FCC may d~e a cable
rate unreasonable only if it substantially exceeds the national averageJor
comparable progranuning (to be redetermined every two years).
A shifting philosophy
These proposals, it is plain, reflect a marked shift in philosophy. The old
roles were based on the assumption that diversity of ownership, both in
ter~ of the number of owners and the kinds of owners, woUld mean
. diversity of views. They presupposed a government role in ensuring a
large and diverse set of speakers. The proposed new rules experiIrient
with a breakdown of the link between content and conduit; they suggest
a role for some sort of conunon carrier regulation. They otherwise seek to .
replace regulation with competition as the engine of diversity.
A variety of different changes have come together here. In part, the shift
in federal law derives from changes in ideology. Over the last20 years, a
fervour for the workings of the market has overtaken a commitment to
federal intervention. Aside from regulation of sexually explicit speech
(where intrusive regulation is increasingly in vogue), policy makers now
impose a far heavier burden of proof on those who would justify
regulatory controls.
The FCC .has so favoured deregulation that none of the traditional
restrictions, .including those on cross-ownership, have seemed secure.
The idea that there should be special efforts to encourage minority voices
in the media now is relegated to thedustbin of history. Worries that no
media company should be too large have given way to ideas that being
big is important. Scholars who long argued that vertical integration was
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not so important as horizontal integration have prevailed, and even
horizontal integration is no longer out of the question. .
This deregulatory fervour has been matched by a shift in First
Amendment thinkin~ emphasising limits on government's ability to
prescribe market barriers and market structure. By the mid-1990s, it was
conimon for judges to hold that the First Amendment right to speak .
protected not only indiViduals and newspapers, not only broadcasters,
but' also cable systems and telephone companies. Laws' that precluded
telephone companies from providing Video serVice' suddenly were cast
into constitutional doubt.
Ideology and'constitutional law aside, the obVious source of regulatory
change was Change in technology. Technological changes brought about
the so-called 'end of scarcity': the creation of seeming abundance in
charmels of distribution. Beyond that,. they made regulatory market
segmentation increasingly artificial and increasingly inefficient. Vertical
integration .of distribution services and prograrrunirig services had
proceeded rapidly. in the 1980s. Broadcast and cable properties came
under common ownership (though, by law, not in the same market).
Because of these new styles of building.businesses, federally-enforced
cartelisation - separating telephony, cable, broadcast and newspapers
- no longer enjoyed private support. 1he large players wanted to·
acquire or be acquired; they saw federal restrictions as obsolete.
The technological changes also mean that the United States cannot make
policy for the electronic media in isolation from the rest of the world. We
have seen global shifts in the structure of telecommunications carriers'
and Video proViders.
Conclusion
Dissolving federal regulation is now seen as a method of increasing the
power .of one of America's major contributors to a favoUrable balance of
payments. Entertainmeht is so important an export, in terms of
economics and international politics, that the Congress and the
Government are inordinately inclined to help the industry position itseJ[
to dominate the world market. .
More generally, the increasingly global'nature of the communications
market~lace is forcing a global harmonisation of communications rules.
It would be impossible, over time, to maintain an equilibritim in which
companies with global pretensions have markedly different structures in
America and throughout the world.
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